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Sell 
Cropping 
Rights 
on 
Your 
Farm? 
by Melvin G. Blase 
W OULD YOU be willing to 
"sell" the right to raise cer-
tain crops on your farm? One of 
the suggested possible programs 
for reducing surplus production 
involves this question. The gov-
ernment would offer to "buy" a 
part of your farm- not acres of 
land, but your legal right to raise 
surplus crops. Essentially, you'd 
sell your right to produce these 
crops for some definite period of 
time by means of land-use ease-
ments. 
This type of program has been 
suggested as a long-term measure 
to cut back production of surplus 
crops. It is a type of program 
which isn't likely to be capitalized 
into land values. The purpose of 
this article is to present the idea 
of an easement program so that 
you can think about it and con-
sider it along with the other ideas 
and suggested programs that are 
being discussed. 
How Would It Work? 
Easements are familiar to many 
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farm people. Your power supplier 
may have used an easement to ac-
quire the right-of-way for a power 
line across your or your neighbor's 
land. A few farmers have had ex-
perience with another use of ease-
ments. To compensate owners for 
occasional brief floods, the gov-
ernment has bought the right to 
flood farmland around the edges 
of reservoirs. Instead of being 
forced off their land when the res-
ervoir was built, farmers have 
planned and continued their oper-
ations- knowing of the possibility 
of being flooded. Easements have 
allowed the government to flood 
the outlying reservoir areas when 
necessary without buying whole 
farms. 
Likewise, under a land-use ease-
ment program to reduce surpluses, 
the federal government would buy 
only your right to produce certain 
crops. The property itself and all 
other rights in the land would con-
tinue to be yours. 
In our system of owning prop-
erty, ownership of a farm or any 
other real property is the exclu-
sive (but not absolute) possession 
of a "bundle of rights." This bun-
dle can be divided. And it's fre-
quently done. If you're a tenant, 
for example, you hold some of the 
rights in the bundle. One of these 
is the right to operate the farm 
for a specified period of time. If 
you've inherited a life estate in a 
farm, you have most of the bun-
dle, though not the right to say 
who will get the farm when you 
die. 
Ownership's "bundle of rights" 
can be divided in many ways. The 
sale of cropping rights through 
land-use easements would be, in 
principle, just another way of di-
viding and selling these rights. 
Purchase of rights to produce 
surplus crops may sound like a 
modified Soil Bank to you. But 
there are two important differ-
ences. ( 1) You could use your 
land in any way you chose except 
to produce specific surplus crops. 
(2) The sale of the easement, if 
you entered such program, would 
probably be for a longer period 
of time than the more familiar 3, 
5 or 10 years of the Soil Bank or 
Conservation Reserve. 
What Compensation? 
What would be a fair price for 
land-use easements? Aside from 
general willingness or unwilling-
ness to participate, this might well 
be the most critical factor. Since 
an easement would transfer some 
rights in land, its price might be 
closely related to land prices. 
Land may sell for about 20 times 
the annual net income it produces 
if mortgage interest is 5 percent. 
That is, if you expect a net in-
come of $10 per acre annually, 
you could pay 5-percent interest 
on an investment of $200 an acre 
for the land. If a land-use ease-
ment had been sold by the previ-
ous owner so that you expected 
the most profitable nonsurplus 
crops to yield $5 net income per 
acre annually, you might offer as 
much as $100 per acre for the land 
(with a 5-percent interest rate). 
But how much should the previ-
ous owner have received for his 
land-use easement? To be as well 
off, he should have received the 
capitalized value of the difference 
between the net income from his 
most profitable crop and the net 
income from his next best allow-
able alternative- in this instance 
$100 per acre. 
The exact price of an easement 
would depend upon, among other 
things, the productivity of the 
soil. Let's take an example from 
southern Iowa and look at the 
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difference in incomes from the 
most productive rotation and from 
permanent pasture-both for an 
eroded Shelby soil and for a 
highly productive Grundy soil. 
On the Shelby soil, a corn-oats-
meadow-meadow rotation will re-
turn about $2 .50 per acre annu-
ally more than permanent pasture. 
A rotation of corn-corn-corn-oats-
meadow on Grundy soil will yield 
about $15 per acre annually more 
than permanent pasture. Capital-
izing these returns at 5-percent in-
terest, gives a rough estimate of 
the cost of a permanent easement 
of $50 per acre for eroded Shelby 
and $300 per acre for the more 
productive Grundy soil. 
From a conservation viewpoint, 
it might be most desirable to ob-
tain easements on the Shelby rath-
er than the Grundy soil in the ex-
ample. But an easement for 1 
acre of Shelby will reduce produc-
tion by an average corn equiva-
lent of only 13 bushels per year 
compared with 34 bushels for 1 
acre of Grundy. 
It might cost the government 
less to secure a permanent reduc-
tion in surplus crops by easements 
than be renting the land indefi-
nitely. But would y.our income be 
lower than under a Soil Bank type 
rental? Probably not, because 
your easement payment would be 
supplemented by annual income 
from the permanent pasture. This 
isn't possible under the Soil Bank 
or Conservation Reserve. 
Why Do Anything? 
A large part of the current farm 
problem is due to surplus produc-
tion. We're producing so much of 
certain commodities that prices 
are being forced too low to give 
labor and capital under average 
management in agriculture a re-
turn equal to their earnings if em-
ployed elsewhere. This has been 
the case for a number of years, 
and it appears that the situation 
will continue unless a solution is 
found. If some of our farm re-
sources aren't shifted to less in-
tensive uses, farm prices are likely 
to remain low for a number of 
years in the future. Attracting 
land to a less intensive use seems 
to off er one of the most painless 
ways of adjusting agricultural pro-
duction downward. 
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The farm problem is a "big" 
and long-run problem. We have 
on hand more than twice our nor-
mal annual carryover of feed 
grains. This is equal to about half 
of all feed grains fed to livestock 
in the 1958-59 feeding year. Our 
wheat stocks exceed all wheat pro-
duced in the nation last year. 
In the 1950's the rate of in-
crease in farm output pushed 
ahead of population growth by 
0.6-0.7 percent a year. With no 
further increase in farm produc-
tion, it would take population 
about 5 years to catch up with 
current production levels. But our 
surplus crop production isn't 
standing still while population 
catches up. Output is increasing 
more rapidly each year, and our 
surpluses, thus, grow at an in-
creasing rate also. In this respect, 
American agriculture is snowball-
ing further out of adjustment with 
population needs. 
If and when the demand for our 
crops takes annual production, we 
will still have the problem of re-
ducing the huge surpluses in 
storage. They're already so large 
that it will take years to eliminate 
them. It seems that our farm prob-
lem won't be solved soon unless 
we develop more effective pro-
grams than we've had. 
This Program Help? 
Unless we use some of our land 
less intensively, our surpluses will 
continue to grow. How can we 
make a shift in this direction most 
effectively? Two guideposts might 
be used: ( 1) Land should be re-
moved from intensive use where 
the cost to society of keeping it in 
its present use is relatively high 
and the resources used with land 
can be transferred to a more pro-
ductive use elsewhere; this would 
contribute to national economic 
efficiency. ( 2) Land should be 
aided out of intensive cropping 
where the erosion hazard is great-
est; it makes little sense to pro-
duce crops we don't need at the 
expense of topsoil that future gen-
erations may need. 
If such a program were adop-
ted, land in the program would 
shift from producing surplus 
crops to increased forage and tim-
ber production. And since a pound 
of meat requires more acres if 
produced on grass rather than 
feed grains, this shift would help 
to shrink farm output in the 
longer run. Because of the time 
needed for timber to mature, a 
shift toward this crop wouldn't 
affect timber marketings for many 
years to come. 
If the main object is to reduce 
production, an easement program 
probably would be most effective 
if cropping rights to whole farms 
were bought. This would shift 
land to less production and also 
decrease production from other 
resources now used with the land. 
If the easements were for only 
parts of farms, it's likely that pro-
duction from the remaining acres 
would increase. But the partial-
farm approach has a soil conserva-
tion value since the most highly 
eroded land on farms would be 
likely to go into the program first. 
Thus, a land-use easement pro-
gram could offer a relatively per-
manent remedy for our farm prob-
lem. If you sold your cropping 
rights, they'd become property of 
the federal government. Eventu-
ally they'd expire or, if permanent, 
could be sold back to the land-
owner in case of an emergency or 
increased demand for crops now 
in surplus. 
Such a relatively permanent 
remedy might be cheapest for tax-
payers when we consider how 
large the surplus problem really is. 
The history of past government 
farm programs shows that it 
would have been cheaper for the 
government to have bought some 
land earlier than to have paid the 
costs of so many programs since 
the early l 930's. 
A land-use easement program 
wouldn't be a complete answer to 
the farm problem. It may be de-
sirable in addition to use more 
land for recreation, to expand the 
conservation program, to make 
more information about nonfarm 
job opportunities available to 
farm youth and to alter the edu-
cation that our farm boys and 
girls receive. 
There may be other methods of 
reducing farm output that would 
be more desirable than land-use 
easements. But there appear to 
be many reasons why a land-use 
easement program would be a step 
in the right direction for the gov-
ernment to help agriculture. 
